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ABSTRACT

The participation of the United States military in stability efforts has increased
dramatically since 2001. The core of current U. S. stabilization policies and measures derives
from the US military's lessons in countering insurgencies since the late 20th century through the
ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and countries experiencing radical Islamic insurgencies.
Counterinsurgency operations focus on gaining support from the relevant population through
security, governance, and economic efforts. This research seeks to improve the understanding of
the relationship between perceptions of security and governance on populations' economic
outlook during stability operations. Applying the “Winning Hearts and Minds” approach to the
United States Agency for International Development Afghan dataset, nine variables for
governance and security were identified.
Two regression models were developed to determine how perceptions of these nine
variables best explain the variance of two attitudinal measures of economic outlook, (1) the
ability to get to markets, and (2) the perceived availability of jobs. When examining the best
predictors, the nine independent variables accounted for 25.2% of the variance of perceived
ability to get to markets and 13.5% of the variance for the perceived availability of jobs. Stepwise regression was conducted to determine significant predictors of both dependent variables.
Results show that overall security, the availability of government services, and perceived
government ability account for 24.3% of the variance in perceived ability to get to markets. In
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contrast, overall security, the availability of government services, and the presence of security
forces account for 12.2 % of the variance in the perceived availability of jobs.
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CHAPTER ONE:
INTRODUCTION

Intra-state conflicts, including civil wars, terrorism, or related political violence, peaked
in the early 1990s after the dissolution of the USSR and steadily declined until the mid-2010s
with the resurgence of conflict in Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, and elsewhere (Szayna, Watts,
O'Mahony, Frederick, & Kavanagh, 2017). These conflicts are also increasingly
internationalized (Figure 1); in other words, either or both the government and non-government
parties receive troop support from an outside government actively participating in the conflict
(Upsalla University, 2004). These conflicts create political instability, which is exploited by
terrorist and transnational criminal organizations and become a significant national security
interest of the United States and its allies (Department of State, 2018).

Figure 1: Armed conflict by type 1946-2019 (Pettersson & Öberg, 2020)
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The participation of the United States military in stability efforts has increased
dramatically since 2001, with widespread stabilization activities conducted in Iraq and
Afghanistan (Robinson, Mann, Martini, & Pezard, 2018). Demand for U.S. involvement in
stabilization efforts will remain high due to the trends in conflict shown above. According to a
Rand Corporation study, the lessons from the past 15 years of war suggest the U.S. must
embrace successful stabilization as a policy priority to successfully conclude these ongoing
conflicts (Robinson et al., 2018).

Specific Problem
As a policy, stabilization involves a process of integrated civilian and military efforts to
create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can manage conflict and
prevent a resurgence of violence (Department of State, 2018). U.S. stability functions conducted
by government agencies supporting stabilization efforts are security, foreign humanitarian
assistance, economic stabilization and infrastructure, the rule of law, and governance (Joint
Chiefs of Staff., 2016).
Economic stabilization policies create economic growth conditions, which can alleviate
underlying tensions and address the chronic social situations that can fuel insurgency or conflict
(Crane, Oliker, Bensahel, Gayton, & Eaton, 2009). Economic stabilization and infrastructure
function includes programs conducted to ensure that affected populations have opportunities for
livelihoods within a predictable economic governance system bound by law (Joint Chiefs of
Staff., 2016). According to the U.S. military doctrine in Joint Publication 3-07, Stability,
economic stabilization, and development help consolidate the gains made from security and
enable political solutions (2016).
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Support from the affected population in a conflict is subject to capture by the side that
provides the most compelling mixture of security and economic assistance (Lyall, Zhou, & Imai,
2020). Winning over local populations should increase support for the legitimate local
authorities. Existing theories, such as “hearts and minds,” which focuses on addressing
grievances among the population, suggest aid shapes attitudes through a direct, income-related
channel (Lyall et al., 2020). Competing theories, such as “Opportunity Cost,” also find the
economic variables and opportunity costs are drivers of participation in rebellion and conflict
(Hoeffler & Collier, 2004). Improvement in economic conditions, whether at the individual or
community level, is thought to generate gratitude toward the government, which is credited for
improved livelihoods and receives increased support from the population (Berman, Shapiro, &
Felter, 2011). But, classical counterinsurgency theorists, such as David Galula, also state that the
population’s approval is conditional, with attitudes toward the opposing sides dictated by their
concern for safety (Grenoble & Rose, 2011).
The purpose of this study is to explore how perceptions of stabilization activities
regarding security and governance affect perceptions of economic opportunity. Specifically, the
following research question (R.Q.):
•

How do perceptions of security and governance predict perceptions of economic
outlook?

Understanding the attitudes and perceptions toward economic opportunity is critical to
developing programs that effectively integrate stabilization functions and produce intended
results.

3

Research Approach
This research question was inspired from personal experience having deployed to
Afghanistan in support of U.S. Army operations in 2011 and 12. I participated in efforts to
improve security, governance and economic development; while simultaneously reducing the
Taliban insurgency’s capabilities. As I watched different programs for economic development
being conducted in the country and I often wondered what were the perceptions of the efforts we
were doing.
This study examines how perceptions of various factors of stability affect individuals’
perceptions of economic outlook. As will be shown, there is a gap in the literature on whether
support for the government or the security status affects economic sentiment. Past studies have
utilized observational or quasi-experimental research designs to identify the presumed link
between aid, attitudes, and violence. Still, they do not examine whether economic aid improved
support for the government at the level where aid is delivered (Lyall et al., 2020).
The study will focus on stability efforts conducted as part of the counterinsurgency
campaign in Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency incorporates stability operations as one of the
three primary forms of operations and has been the bulk of military stability operations for the
last two decades. Afghanistan was chosen because it has been a significant area of stabilization
efforts and is familiar to the researcher due to his prior military deployment to the country.
The research evaluates attitudinal data gathered through the United States Agency for
International Development’s (USAID) Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI)
Project.

The MISTI project sought to measure stabilization trends and impacts of USAID

programs conducted in Afghanistan. In addition, USAID sought to build a community of
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practice to monitor and evaluate its economic development projects undertaken in Afghanistan
(Agency for International Development, 2017).
The MISTI survey data contains responses from five semi-annual iterations of surveys
conducted from September 2012 through November 2014. The survey includes responses from
190,264 individual interviews in 5,093 different villages across 130 districts of the 23 provinces.
MISTI is the largest and most comprehensive analysis and impact evaluation of USG
stabilization interventions in Afghanistan (Agency for International Development, 2017).
The theoretical framework used in the research was the “Winning Hearts and Minds”
(WHAM) theory of violence during insurgencies (Berman, Shapiro, et al., 2011; Böhnke &
Zürcher, 2013; Egnell, 2010). The central ideas of this theory are that without the support of the
local population, the aims of the belligerents will not be achieved (Egnell, 2010), and civilian
attitudes towards combatants are tied to subsequent behavior (Berman, Shapiro, et al., 2011;
James D Fearon, 2008). In other words, win over people’s hearts and minds, and their behavior
will follow (Lyall et al., 2020).

Using the tenets of WHAM theory, we examined the MISTI

data and developed regression models to determine how perceptions of stability functions can
best explain the variance of two attitudinal economic outlook measures, (1) the ability to get to
markets and (2) the perceived availability of jobs.

Contribution to Research
The findings from this research provide insight into how perceptions of security and
governance explain perceptions of the ability to get to markets and the job availability in local
areas.
This research seeks to improve the understanding of the relationship between perceptions
of security and governance on the economic outlook of populations during stability operations.
5

It contributes to the body of knowledge by providing a model of the effects of security and
governance perception on attitudes toward economic outlook. The hope is this research can
inform future practitioners/planners in developing better “whole of government” efforts to
promote stability and reduce violence in conflict-affected areas.

Organization of the Dissertation
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will review prior
research on stabilization efforts and the effects of economic development in reducing conflict. It
will identify possible gaps in knowledge on the relationship of the different pillars, specifically
in how security and governance affect economic outlook. Chapter 3 will detail the dataset and
methodology used by applying a WHAM theory to analyze how grievances' resolution affects
economic opportunity. Chapter 4 details the findings of the data analysis. Finally, Chapter 5
discusses the research conducted and identifies opportunities for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO:
LITERATURE
REVIEW

Introduction
The literature search process revealed an extensive breadth of research on
insurgency/counterinsurgency, including competing theories on the causes of countries entering
civil war and insurgencies. A smaller, substantive body of research on the effects of economic
development in both conflict and post-conflict areas is primarily related to the impact of
economic development in violence reduction. Research on the determinants of economic
sentiment in stability operations is significantly lacking. The following research question (R.Q.)
was proposed to gain further insight regarding this gap in the literature.
•

How do perceptions of security and governance predict perceptions of economic

outlook?
Approach
A series of iterative literature searches were conducted to identify the existing body of
research. The initial literature search was based on past work done in support of another course
within the program. This initial literature review was directed toward the effects of microfinance
in economic development in stability operations. The search was conducted on ABI/Inform on
the terms “economic development,” “insurgency,” and “counterinsurgency.” The searches
generated a large number of references for further analysis. However, by combining terms, such
7

as “economic development in counterinsurgency,” a list of approximately 35 studies and articles
was generated. This list comprised the first literature search conducted.
The second literature review resulted from outreach to various experts in the field. As
part of understanding the dataset used for the research, I contacted Dr. Ethan B. Kapstein,
Arizona Centennial Professor of International Affairs at the McCain Institute for International
Leadership at Arizona State University. Dr. Kapstein led a team from the Empirical Studies of
Conflict (ESOC) Project at Princeton University and the United States Institute of Peace and
conducted a comprehensive study on the impact of economic aid on violence in Afghanistan. I
approached Dr. Kapstein to inquire about research conducted by his team. Dr. Kapstein sent me
a Rand Working Paper (WR-1191), Lessons Learned from Stabilization Initiatives in
Afghanistan: A Systematic Review of Existing Research. This document included a reference to
over 89 policy documents, research studies, and meta-analyses. A review of this document and
narrowing to research studies produced a list of 20 papers for further analysis.
The final literature search was conducted using the EconLit search database. The search
terms were “economic sentiment” and “economic development.” The search was constrained to
full text, peer-reviewed documents published within the last ten years, and produced a list of 117
papers, which once filtered for the subject “economic development” was narrowed down to five
documents. Economic perception resulted in 198 pieces narrowed to 15 when applying the
“economic development” filter. The final list covered a broad spectrum of references dating
from 1966 to 2017. I included a variety of journal articles, books, and other sources. Ultimately,
I selected 56 of the most relevant references from the series of three literature searches.
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Literature Review
Although conflict is a widely researched domain, there is a substantial degree of variation
in the definition of stabilization (Plumb, Shapiro, Crisman, Singh, & Mao, 2017). The
Department of Defense Joint Publication 3-07, Stability, describes stabilization efforts as:
“effects created by activities of the United States Government (USG) outside the U.S.
using one or more of the instruments of national power to minimize, if not eliminate, economic
and political instability and other drivers of violent conflict across one or more of the five USG
stability sectors (i.e., security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social wellbeing, governance and participation, and economic stabilization and infrastructure) (Joint Chiefs
of Staff., 2016).”
For this research, we will use the definition given by USAID in the Measuring Impacts of
Stabilization Initiative (MISTI), the source of data for this study. Stabilization is defined “as
improvement in the perceptions of physical security, quality of life, economic opportunities,
satisfaction in local leaders, fair treatment from local government and authorities, and
predictability of these in the course of their daily lives (U.S. Agency for International
Development, 2013).”
What follows is a review of a portion of existing literature to provide a view into the
ongoing debate on the effectiveness of economic development in improving conflict areas’
stability. The body of literature reviewed is divided into three categories, (1)
Insurgency/Counterinsurgency, (2) Hearts and Minds Theory, and (3) Economic Development in
Counterinsurgency. The intent is to provide a context in which to analyze the effects of stability
operations in conflict areas.
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Insurgency/Counterinsurgency
The core of current stabilization policies and efforts is derived from the lessons learned
by the U.S. military in countering insurgencies both in the late 20th century and current
counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other countries that are experiencing
radical Islamic insurgencies. Insurgencies and ‘low-intensity small wars’ have constituted the
norm of war for conflicts since 1945 (Jones & Smith, 2010; Kilcullen, 2006a; Marlowe, 2009).
To understand stabilization policies and stability operations, one must understand the theories
related to the insurgent conflict.
The terms insurgency and counterinsurgency arose during the post-World War II era wars
in response to Mao’s doctrine of revolutionary warfare and the works of critical theorists,
including David Galula, Vo Nguyen Giap, Che Guevara, and Frank Kitson (Kilcullen, 2006a;
Marlowe, 2009). Insurgencies were based on the struggle for power between the state
(counterinsurgent) and a challenging part of its population (insurgent) (Galula, 2006; Grenoble &
Rose, 2011; Kilcullen, 2006a; Marlowe, 2009).
In classic counterinsurgency, the insurgent challenges an established regime, and the
counterinsurgent seeks to reinforce the state and defeat the insurgent. In his seminal work,
Counterinsurgency Warfare, David Galula (2006) states the key to guerrilla warfare is the
complicity of the population. He notes that complicity (active support) is not the same as
sympathy (passive support). He further states the popularity of the insurgents is not enough to
transform sympathy into complicity. It is noted that participation by the population is gained by a
political organization living among the people and backed by force to eliminate its enemies,
intimidate potential enemies, and rely on supporters (Galula, 2006).
10

Counterinsurgency, COIN, is the state’s efforts to undermine and ultimately destroy an
insurgency. A counterinsurgency campaign goal is to create a functioning government state that
provides for its citizens and promotes regional and international stability (Joint Chiefs of Staff,
2018; Kilcullen, 2006a; Marlowe, 2009; U.S. Army, 2006). Most of the counterinsurgent efforts
in historical wars of revolution tended to build a political machine at the grassroots-level to
isolate the insurgent from the population (Galula, 2006; Grenoble & Rose, 2011). Galula went
on to define the tenets of counterinsurgency warfare as follows:
1. Support of the population is as necessary for counterinsurgents as the insurgent.
2. Support is gained through an active minority.
3. Support from the population is conditional.
4. Intensity of effort and vastness and means are essential.

Modern insurgency differs from its classical predecessor in many respects, including the
rise of technology and non-state actors in broadening the insurgent struggle’s scope and nature.
Theorists note modern insurgency expands the battle to control contested political space between
the state (or group of states or occupying powers), and one or more popularly based, non-state
challengers, who may or may not be part of their population (Grenoble & Rose, 2011; Kilcullen,
2006b). It is no longer about merely overthrowing an existing oppressive government. Though,
as shown in Iraq and Afghanistan, insurgencies can seek to change the status quo by ousting an
occupying force or Government (Bell, 2011).
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Theories of insurgency/counterinsurgency
Theories of insurgency and counterinsurgency differ from conventional models of
interstate conflict in their emphasis on the decisive role of non-combatants; winning modern
COIN should be “population-centric” and requires transforming population engagement into a
long-term goal of the state (Bell, 2011; Berman, Shapiro, et al., 2011; Gregg, 2009; Kilcullen,
2006b; Petraeus, 2006; U.S. Army, 2006). Unlike conventional warfare, the counterinsurgent
must combine the destruction of the insurgent’s forces and his political organization with the
permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation maintained by and with the
people of the state (Grenoble & Rose, 2011).
Counterinsurgency operations are distinguished by their focus on the relevant population
and their strategic purpose, “to gain or maintain control or influence over, and the support of that
relevant population through political, psychological, and economic methods (Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 2018).” As the center of gravity for both sides in COIN, the population is the critical
element each side attempts to affect; whoever gains the population’s support wins (Cohen,
2014).
One theory of counterinsurgency is the “Opportunity Cost” theory, which holds that
participation in an insurgency is a function of economic motivation and not objective grievances
(Hoeffler & Collier, 2004). Collier and Hoeffler (2004) analyzed civil wars from 1969-1999 and
determined the availability of finance and per capita income have statistically significant effects
on predicting conflict risk, whereas objective grievances, such as inequality, political rights, and
ethnic/religious polarization did not.
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A competing theory for counterinsurgency, the “Hearts and Minds” theory holds that as
the government can secure the population and address popularly held grievances, the local
people will reciprocate and reward the government and its forces with their support (Bell, 2011;
Berman, Shapiro, et al., 2011; Bjelajac, 1966; Donley, 2016; Galula, 2006; Gregg, 2009; U.S.
Army, 2006). Understanding the attitudes and behaviors of the civilian population becomes as
crucial as understanding the adversary and his capabilities (Brown, Ingram, Kudat, & Gillette,
2010). The literature shows that a key to constraining insurgents is the ability of non-combatants
to share information with counterinsurgents (Berman, Callen, Felter, & Shapiro, 2011; Berman,
Shapiro, et al., 2011; James D Fearon, 2008; Galula, 2006).
Hearts and minds theory has gained traction over the years, but studies have yet to find
conclusive results of its impact in reducing violence over time. Berman et al. (2011) show the
U.S. military-led Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) reduced conflict in Iraq
during a period of increased U.S. troop strength. But other analyses do not find a significant
impact of aid projects lowering levels of violence (Child, 2014; Chou, 2012; Plumb et al., 2017).
Despite this, the prevailing view advocates for the population-centric focus of COIN to
defeat insurgencies. COIN signals movement away from counterterrorism tactics (kill the
enemy) to population-centric tactics (hearts and minds) to engage population support (Bell,
2011). Counterinsurgency requires unified action to support a host nation (H.N.), reinforce the
legitimacy of the government and its effective control of the environment, thereby engendering
support from the population to the H.N. government rather than the insurgency (Joint Chiefs of
Staff, 2018)
David Kilcullen (2006b) provides a framework for conducting unified action in
counterinsurgency operations with his “Three Pillars” model.
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Figure 2: Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency (Kilcullen, 2006b)

In his remarks delivered at the 2006 U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference,
Dr. Kilcullen provided this framework as a means to illustrate how various efforts would fit in a
counterinsurgency campaign. The framework builds on classical counterinsurgency theory, and
he notes, can be applied to other complex inter-agency efforts, including peace operations,
stabilization and reconstruction, and complex humanitarian emergencies. As the base, a broad
information strategy is essential to understand the environment, the effects of operations, and
influence perceptions of the local, regional, and global audiences (Kilcullen, 2006b).
Dr. Kilcullen defines his “pillars” along three primary lines of effort, which are of equal
importance and developed in parallel. Each pillar enables the establishment of control for the
counterinsurgent, and for the U.S., the ability to eventually transfer power back to the H.N.
government.
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Economic Development in Counterinsurgency
Despite the differences between classical and modern insurgencies, economic
development remains a crucial pillar of COIN. For example, through F.Y. 2016, the U.S.
Department of State (DoS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had
received over $123.2 Billion for foreign operations and development in support of efforts on the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) (Williams & Epstein, 2017). As noted in the article
Integrating Economic and Social Aspects into Military Operations, “winning a war without
winning the hearts, minds, and pocketbooks of the people may provide the occasional
battlefield victory…achieving sustained success will not follow without them” (Brown
et al., 2010).
Countries with a lack of mobility in wealth and high inequality often end up in conflict
(Boix, 2008). As a critical task within COIN, economic development is conducted to improve
the population’s livelihood and support for the host government. Economic development is a
crucial pillar of COIN, providing the counterinsurgent and population incentives to resolve
factors of instability and bolster local support to the host nation (H.N.) government (Donley,
2016). It gives opportunities to improve livelihood, overcome black markets, and promote job
diversity in the private and public sectors (Schramm, 2010). Security operations conducted in
support of a COIN strategy are coordinated with economic development to enhance security and
potentially improve the local overall political situation (U.S. Army, 2006).
But in COIN, “Money, and therefore economic development, are effective only as in they
bolster government legitimacy (Donley, 2016).” Since the goal of any COIN effort is to build
popular support for the H.N../Counterinsurgent government, it is critical to conduct economic
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development efforts using host nation implementers as much as possible and give credit to the
host nation to bolster their credibility (Donley, 2016).
It is recognized that economic development efforts are part of a larger and broader
strategy involving security and political components (Amara, 2012; Berman, Felter, Shapiro, &
Troland, 2013; Brown et al., 2010; Schramm, 2010). Economic development should be fully
integrated and synchronized with political and security processes to provide maximum effect
(Donley, 2016). Properly integrated, economic development complements both political and
security objectives (Bodnar & Gwinn, 2010; Donley, 2016; Kilcullen, 2006b). The
synchronization of the three allows economic development to support security forces and
increase political support for the local government.
Economic Outlook
Economic development impacts the population and their perceptions of opportunity, but
the population’s perceptions are also influenced by their environment and beliefs about security,
the effectiveness of government, and other social issues. Economic and social dimensions
become most important for the military during stability operations, though they are also crucial
in offensive and defensive operations during counterinsurgency (Brown et al., 2010; U.S. Army,
2019; U.S. Army & U.S. Marine Corps, 2014).
Understanding the relationship between security, governance, and economic outlook is
important because how the economy is perceived by the population affects decision-making and
behavior in regards to economic participation. Unfortunately, the search for literature on these
topics yielded minimal results, with most economic sentiment articles related to developed
economies and consumer behavior. This gap in the literature provided the impetus for the
research question, with the analyses and interpretation to follow in the subsequent chapters.
16

CHAPTER THREE:
METHODOLOGY
Research Overview
The research conducted was based on an existing study commissioned by the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID). Based on the literature review’s
research gap, inductive quantitative research was conducted to analyze the data and determine
the interaction between factors of stability and economic outlook.
Dataset
USAID commissioned a study by Management Systems International (MSI) to determine
the effects of stabilization programs in Afghanistan. The MISTI project sought to measure
stabilization trends and determine impacts. In addition, it sought to build a community of
practice to monitor and evaluate USAID economic development projects conducted in
Afghanistan. USAID/Afghanistan’s MISTI ranks as the largest and most comprehensive trend
analysis and impact evaluation of stabilization interventions that the U.S. Government has ever
undertaken (Agency for International Development, 2017).
This MISTI survey (Appendix A) contains the response data from five semi-annual
iterations of surveys conducted from September 2012 through November 2014. The surveys’
objective was to determine whether USAID project activities caused stability and resilience
changes at the district and village levels. MSI conducted 190,264 individual interviews in 5,093
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different villages across 130 districts of the 23 provinces, where stabilization initiatives were
being implemented or considered (Agency for International Development, 2017).
Research Overview
This research was conducted based on my experiences during a deployment with the U.S.
military to Afghanistan. Understanding population sentiment and perceptions of governance and
security were part of the duties I performed during that time. The idea of understanding how
these perceptions affected economic outlook was then further developed as part of an assignment
for my studies of Master of Science in International Relations.
The original intent of the research was to conduct data mining and structural equation
modeling to analyze the structure of the relationships among factors of stability and microfinance
data. Based on past work and the gaps identified during the literature review, the intent was to
use data mining techniques to uncover relationships among the questions in the survey and
merge the data set with data from the World Bank. Then it was planned to develop the best fit
model explaining the relationships between Economic Outlook and other stability factors with
measures of microfinance projects. After being unable to obtain the microfinance data because
of disruptions due in large part to COVID-19, the objective of the research changed to establish
correlations and relationships of economic sentiment perceptions with associated stability
factors. A detailed review of the dataset was conducted, and I decided to use ordinary least
squares multiple regression to analyze the relationship of the stability factors with economic
sentiment perceptions and to examine which factors best predicted these perceptions.
Research Design
Due to the large size of the survey dataset, a thorough review of the data was conducted
between June and August 2020. During that time, it was determined that there needed to be an
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extensive cleanup of the data set provided by USAID. First, it was necessary to convert the data
from a textual scale output into numerical values, which could then be analyzed for regression
modeling. Second, blanks or unreadable data needed to be coded so that it would not adversely
affect the analysis.
Dataset Organization
The substantive portion of the questionnaire was broken down by USAID into the following modules:

Table 1: MISTI Survey Modules
Module Category

Questions

Security and Crime

(Q2a – Q7b)

Governance

(Q8 – Q14h)

Service Provision and Development

(Q15 – Q19b)

Rule of Law

(Q20a – Q22c)

Corruption

(Q23 – Q25)

Quality of Life

(Q26 – Q30)

Economic Activity

(Q31 – Q33)

Community Cohesion and Resilience
Grievances

(Q34a – Q39b)
(Q40a-b)

Media

(Q41a – Q42b)

Indirect Questions

(Q43 – Q50)

The questionnaire consisted of 37 management and quality control variables, 85
substantive questions, and 31 demographic questions (U.S. Agency for International
Development, 2013). For this research, no items were used from the modules related to the rule
of law, corruption, media, and indirect questions.
In the MISTI project, USAID identified six factors of stabilization:
1. Physical Security
2. Satisfaction in Local Leaders
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3. Fair Treatment From Their Local Government And Legal Authorities
4. Predictability of Outcomes
5. Quality of Life
6. Economic Opportunities

A thorough review of the questionnaire was completed in order to understand how the
survey modules related to the six factors of stabilization and to the research question. This
review allowed me to focus the data set on items that best fit the categories of security,
governance, and economic outlook. Eleven questions were chosen to be analyzed.
Table 2: Questions to be analyzed by factor
Stability Factor
Security
Governance
Economic Outlook

Question
(Q2a-c) (Q6_1-6_2) (Q7a-b)
(Q9 - Q11) (Q14g) (Q15)
(Q31) (Q33)

Modules not included in this study could present an opportunity for further research. The
next sections will break down each factor and detail the questions chosen and their justifications.
In addition, hypotheses were formed based on the questions selected.
Dependent Variables
Economic Outlook
The MISTI dataset contained three questions under the category of Economic
Opportunities, questions 31 through 33. The questions used in this research in assessing
economic outlook were question 31 (the ability to get to markets) and question 33 (availability of
jobs). I used these questions for the research because they are directly related to development
efforts conducted by USAID. I chose not to include Question 32 (prices of basic goods) because
I saw this as outside the scope of USAID efforts and the research. Macroeconomic drivers of
prices and their effects on perceptions could be researched at a later time.
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ABILITY TO GET TO MARKET: Q31. Compared to a year ago, how would you
describe your ability to get to your local markets? Is it much better, a little better, about the same,
a little worse, or much worse?
AVAILABILITY OF JOBS: Q33. Compared to a year ago, how would you describe the
availability of paid jobs in your local area? Are there a lot more, a little more, about the same, a
few less, or a lot less paid jobs available in your local area?
Independent Variables
Security

Security questions were identified from the security and crime modules of the survey.
While the exploratory factor analysis provided support for a manner to combine and create a
composite variable for physical security if deemed necessary, I determined that I preferred to
maintain the identified categories in order to examine a more complex relationship between each
security factor and their association with the economic outlook variables.
Questions used were question two (overall security), question six (related to security
forces), and question seven (the ability of security forces to secure the area). Items not
considered were questions 3 and question 4, which were related to specific subsets of security,
such as security at home and on the roads; question five was not considered because it was
specific to crime. These questions could be used for analysis in future research.
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Overall security
Overall security is the sum of results for each of the questions 2a through 2c. Each subquestion was measured with a 5-point Likert scale. For analysis, I combined the scores to create
a combined scale.
Q2a. Would you say security in your local area is good, fair or poor? Is that ‘very
good/poor’?
Q2b. Is your local area more secure, just as secure, or less secure than it was a year ago?
Is that ‘much more/less secure’ or ‘a little more/less secure’?
Q2c. And what about a year from now, do your expect your local area will be more
secure, just as secure, or less secure than it is now? Is that ‘much more/less secure’ or ‘a little
more/less secure’? (why excluded)
As one of Kilcullen’s key pillars, security is necessary to enable economic development,
and so I hypothesize it is positively related to both economic outlook variables. I also expect
these relationships to be strong.
Hypothesis 1A: Overall security will have a statistically significant positive relationship
to the ability to get to market.
Hypothesis 1B: Overall security will have a statistically significant positive relationship
to the availability of jobs.
Security presence
Q6.1 (a-f). How would you rate the presence of [Insert item] in your area?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Afghan National Army
Arbaki (local militia)
Afghan National Police
Armed Opposition Groups
Afghan Local Police
ISAF
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The presence of security forces is considered essential to show the resolve of the
government and help instill confidence in the population to support the government (Galula,
2006; Petraeus, 2006; U.S. Army, 2006). Also, the literature shows the importance of having a
military presence during development execution (Kapstein & Kathuria, 2012; Plumb et al.,
2017). I hypothesize security presence is positively related to both economic variables. I also
expect these relationships to be moderately strong.
Hypothesis 2A: Security Presence will have a statistically significant positive relationship
to the ability to get to market.
Hypothesis 2B: Security Presence will have a statistically significant positive relationship
to the availability of jobs.
Security confidence
Q6.2(a-b). Overall, how much confidence do you have in ... [Insert Item] to make your
area safe? Would you say you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, a little confidence or
no confidence at all?
1. Afghan National Army
2. Afghan National Police

Confidence in the security forces should help build local trust and facilitate cooperation
by the population towards the government (U.S. Army, 2006). Therefore, I hypothesize security
confidence is positively related to both ability to get to markets and the availability of jobs.
While perceptions of the Afghan security forces have not always been positive (Akseer et al.,
2017), I expect these relationships to be moderately related.
Hypothesis 3A: Security Confidence will have a statistically significant positive
relationship to the ability to get to market.
Hypothesis 3B: Security Confidence will have a statistically significant positive
relationship with the availability of jobs.
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Security ability
Q7(a-b). Overall, has the ability of the [Insert Item] to provide security in your area
improved, worsened, or stayed the same in the past year? Is that improved/worsened a little or a
lot?
1. Afghan National Army
2. Afghan National Police

Building the capability of host nation security forces is a crucial goal to help enable the
transition to host nation rule in both stability and counterinsurgency (Galula, 2006; Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 2018; Petraeus, 2006). The security forces play an essential role in gaining and
maintaining the confidence of the population through their ability to provide security and also
through their interaction with the people (Joint Chiefs of Staff., 2016; Osburg, Paul, SaumManning, Madden, & Payne, 2014; U.S. Army, 2006). I hypothesize the population’s perception
of security ability to be positively related to both the ability to get to markets and the perceived
availability of jobs. I expect security ability will have a strong correlation with the ability to get
to market and at least a moderate correlation with the availability of jobs.
Hypothesis 4A: Security Ability will have a statistically significant positive relationship
to the ability to get to market.
Hypothesis 4B: Security Ability will have a statistically significant positive relationship
with the availability of jobs.
Governance
Satisfaction in local leaders and governance was determined by reviewing the questions
in the governance module of the survey. The factors to be reviewed were question 9
(confidence), question 10 (responsiveness), question 11 (ability), question 14g (fair treatment),
and question 15 (availability of services). I only used one question for fair treatment, question
14g, since it was the only question found that clearly addressed the fairness of service by the
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government. While it can be considered a limitation of the research, I believe it is justified
because the question is clear to the function.
Questions not used in the study were questions 8 (regard for government in the area), 12
(related to district development assemblies), and question 13 (connected to community
development councils). Both the district development assemblies and the community
development councils are part of development programs (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2015)
and not part of the formal system of governance; for that reason, I excluded these questions from
the research. They do, however, impact the selection of economic development projects, an area
that should be researched in the future.
The importance of the populations’ satisfaction in governance cannot be overstated. If
the government fails to improve the ability to govern and implements a poor counterinsurgency
strategy, it only prolongs the conflict and causes a shift of support to the insurgent (James D.
Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Kilcullen, 2006a). The population’s confidence in government,
perceptions of government responsiveness, capability, fair treatment, and availability of services
are all critical. I hypothesize these are all positively related to the economic outlook variables.
Though not within the scope of the research, because of the historical problem of corruption
within the Afghan government (Beath et al., 2015; Kapstein & Kathuria, 2012; Plumb et al.,
2017), I expect the correlation to be moderately weak with dependent variables.
Confidence in government officials
Q9 (a-d). How much confidence do you have in your [Insert Position/Organization]? Is it
a lot of confidence, some confidence, not much confidence, or no confidence at all?...
1.
2.
3.
4.

District Governor
District Government
Local village/neighborhood leaders
Provincial Governor
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Hypothesis 5A: Confidence in government officials will have a statistically significant
positive relationship to the ability to get to market.
Hypothesis 5B: Confidence in government officials will have a statistically significant
positive relationship to the availability of jobs.

Government responsiveness
Q10 (a-d). How responsive do you think your [Insert Item] is/are to the needs of the local
people in this area? Is [insert item] very responsive, somewhat responsive, somewhat
unresponsive, or very unresponsive?...
1.
2.
3.
4.

District Governor
District Government
Local village/neighborhood leaders
Provincial Governor

Hypothesis 6A: Government responsiveness will have a statistically significant positive
relationship to the ability to get to market.
Hypothesis 6B: Government responsiveness will have a statistically significant positive
relationship to the availability of jobs.
Government ability
Q11 (a-d). Over the past year, has the [Insert Item] ability to get things done in this area
improved, worsened, or has there been no change? Is that ‘improved/worsened a little or a lot’?
1.
2.
3.
4.

District Governor
District Government
Local village/neighborhood leaders
Provincial Governor

Hypothesis 7A: Government ability will have a statistically significant positive
relationship to the ability to get to market.
Hypothesis 7B: Government ability will have a statistically significant positive
relationship to the availability of jobs.
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Fair treatment
Q14g. I am going to read out two statements, please tell me which statement is closest to
your opinion: The district government does/does not deliver basic services to this area in a fair
manner.

Hypothesis 8A: Fair treatment will have a statistically significant positive relationship to
the ability to get to market.
Hypothesis 8B: Fair treatment will have a statistically significant positive relationship
related to the availability of jobs.
Availability of government services
Q15. Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved,
worsened, or not changed in the past year? Is that improved/worsened a lot or a little’?

Hypothesis 9A: Availability of government services will have a statistically significant
positive relationship to the ability to get to market.
Hypothesis 9B: Availability of government services will have a statistically significant
positive relationship to the availability of jobs.
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CHAPTER FOUR:
RESULTS
Measures and Descriptive Statistics
Independent variables
Overall security (Q2) was measured with two items: “Would you say security in your
local area is good?” and “Is your local area more secure than it was a year ago?”. The lower the
score, the more secure the participant felt. Both items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type
scale, and their answer totals ranged from 2 to 10, with a mean of 5.12 and a standard deviation
of 1.85.

Figure 3: : Descriptive Statistics - Overall Security
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Based on the results of the descriptive statistics, we see that there is a slight decline in the
perception of overall security between 2012 to 2013 and 2013 to 2014. While not within the
scope of this study, it is essential to note that there is a decline in overall security in the eyes of
the local populace, but with a mean of 5.12, the overall sentiment would indicate overall security
is perceived to be between “good” and “fair.” According to the winning hearts and minds theory,
we would then expect to see a decline in the economic outlook perception.

Security presence (Q6_1) was measured with six items that measured the presence of
the following in the participants’ area: Afghan National Army, Arbaki (local tribal security
force), Afghan National Police, Armed Opposition Groups, Afghan Local Police, and the ISAF
(NATO International Security Force). All six items were measured using a 3-point Likert-type
scale, and their answer totals ranged from 6 to 18, with a mean of 12.30 and a standard deviation
of 2.66. The lower the score, the more presence of security forces in the area.

Figure 4: Descriptive Statistics – Security Presence
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According to the data, there seems to be a noticeable decline in the number of security
forces perceived to be present in the area. Of note is that while there is a decline in security
forces' perceived presence, the overall mean of 2.66 suggests the population noted some presence
of security forces year over year.
Security Confidence (Q6_2) was measured with two items that measured the
participants’ perception of the ability of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National
Police to keep their local area safe. Both items were measured using a 4-point Likert-type scale
from 1 (a lot of confidence) to 4 (no confidence). The totals ranged from 2 to 8, with a mean of
3.90 and a standard deviation of 1.57.

Figure 5: Descriptive Statistics – Security Confidence
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According to the data, we see a decline in confidence in the security forces. With the
mean of 3.9, the lack of confidence in the security forces is relatively high within the population.
Security ability (Q7) was measured with two items that measured the perceived
improvement in the previous year: Overall, has the ability of the Afghan National Army and the
Afghan National Police to provide security in your area improved, worsened, or stayed the same
in the past year? Both items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale, and the answer
totals ranged from 2 to 10, with a mean of 4.47 and a standard deviation of 1.78. The lower the
score, the more improvement in perceptions.

Figure 6: Descriptive Statistics – Security Ability
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We see in the data that there is a slight decline in the perception of the ability forces to
secure the area. But with a mean of 4.47, we see they perceive their ability to be somewhere
between a “slight improvement” and “about the same.”

Confidence in government officials (Q9) was measured using four items that measured
the confidence participants had in their following officials: District Governor, District
Government, Local Village/Neighborhood leaders, and their Provincial Governor. The items
were measured using a 4-point Likert-type scale from 1 (a lot of confidence) to 4 (no
confidence). The answer totals ranged from 4 to 16, with a mean of 8.46 and a standard deviation
of 2.56.

Figure 7: Descriptive Statistics – Confidence in Government Officials
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Based on our analysis, there is a slight decline in confidence over the years. Still, with a
mean of 8.46, the overall confidence in government officials is somewhere between some
confidence and not much confidence.

Government responsiveness (Q10) was measured using four items that measured the
confidence the participants had in their following officials: District Governor, District
Government, Local Village/Neighborhood leaders, and their Provincial Governor. The items
were measured using a 4-point Likert-type scale from 1 (very responsive) to 4 (very
unresponsive). The answer totals ranged from 4 to 16, with a mean of 8.58 and a standard
deviation of 2.60.

Figure 8: Descriptive Statistics – Government Responsiveness
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According to the data from 2012 to 2014, the overall perception of government
responsiveness does not change. With the mean of 8.58, we see that the overall perception of
government responsiveness appears to be “somewhat responsive.”

Government ability (Q11) was measured using four items that measured the
participants’ perception of their District Governor, District Government, Local
Village/Neighborhood leaders, and their Provincial Governor to get things done better than the
previous year. The items were measured using a 5-point Likert-type scale from 1 (improved a
lot) to 5 (worsened a lot). The answer totals ranged from 4 to 20, with a mean of 9.84 and a
standard deviation of 3.11.
Perceptions of government ability from 2012 to 2014 stay between 9.5 and 10, a drop that
represents a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to satisfy the population's needs. With
a mean of 9.84 the overall perception appears to have gone from “improved a little” to “stayed
the same.”
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Figure 9: Descriptive Statistics – Government Ability
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Fair treatment (Q14g) was measured using the following item: The district government
does/does not deliver basic services to this area in a fair manner. This item was dichotomous,
with 0 equaling “The District Government delivers basic services to this area in a fair manner”
and 1 equaling “The District Government does not deliver basic services to this area in a fair
manner.” The mean was 0.52, with a standard deviation of 0.50.
Perceptions of Fair treatment also appear not significantly to change during the period of
the research. With the mean value of 0.52, it seems almost evenly split between whether the
government delivers basic services fairly and not.

Figure 10: Descriptive Statistics – Fair treatment

Availability of government services (Q15) was measured using the following question:
“Overall, do you think that services from the government in this area have improved, worsened,
or not changed in the past year?” on a scale of 1 (improved a lot) to 5 (worsened a lot). The mean
response was 2.64, with a standard deviation of 1.03.
While we see a slight decline in the overall perception of government services, the mean
value of 2.64 suggests the population's perception be that government services lie somewhere
between improved a little and not changed from the prior year.
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Figure 11: Descriptive Statistics - Availability of Government Services
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Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable is perceived economic sentiment. There are two
measured aspects of economic sentiment that this research is interested in examining.
The ability to get to markets (Q31) was measured by the item “Compared to a year ago,
how would you describe your ability to get to your local markets?” on a scale of 1 (much better)
to 5 (much worse). The mean response was 2.67, with a standard deviation of 1.06.

Figure 12: Descriptive Statistics – Ability to Get to Markets
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For the period analyzed, we see that the perception of the ability to get to market
deteriorates slightly. The mean of 2.67 suggests the overall sentiment of the surveyed
population’s ability to get market is “a little better” to “about the same as the prior year.”

Availability of Jobs (Q33) was measured by the item “Compared to a year ago, how
would you describe the availability of paid jobs in your local area?” on a scale of 1 (a lot more)
to 5 (a lot less). The mean response was 3.07, with a standard deviation of 1.18. The perception
of job availability also deteriorates from 2012 to 2014. With a mean of 3.07, the overall
sentiment seems that job availability remains “about the same” year over year. The descriptive
statistics are summarized below (Table 3).

Figure 13: Descriptive Statistics - Availability of Jobs
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Summary of Descriptive Statistics
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for the Studied Variables
Variable
Ability to get to markets (DV)
Availability of Jobs (DV)
Overall security
Security presence
Security confidence
Security ability
Confidence in government officials
Government responsiveness
Government ability
Fair treatment
Availability of government services

N
139,618
139,938
139,618
134,964
104,970
137,605
138,142
138,068
138,148
137,293
139,594

Mean
2.68
3.07
5.12
12.23
3.90
4.47
8.46
8.58
9.84
1.48
2.64

SD
1.04
1.18
1.85
2.66
1.57
1.78
2.56
2.60
3.11
0.50
1.03

Min
1
1
2
6
2
2
4
4
4
1
1

Max
5
5
10
18
8
10
16
16
20
2
5

Bivariate Correlations
The next step in the analysis was to examine the variables' direct relationships with each
other and determine if the hypotheses are true. I am was also interested in the strength of the
independent variables' relationships with the dependent variables. The bivariate correlation
matrix is presented below.

Table 4: Bivariate Correlations
1. Get to Market
2. Availability of Jobs
3. Overall Security
4. Security Presence
5. Security Confidence
6. Security Ability
7. Confidence in
Government Officials
8. Government
Responsiveness
9. Government ability
10. Fair treatment
11. Availability of
government services
** = p < 0.01

1
1
.35**
.39**
.12**
.27**
.27**

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

1
.23**
.16**
.06**
.09**

1
.01**
.38**
.41**

1
.02**
.12**

1
.62**

1

.27**

.12**

.42**

.09**

.50**

.52**

1

.28**

.14**

.40**

.12**

.47**

.49**

.73**

1

.33**
.23**

.20**
.16**

.42**
.28**

.15**
.09**

.45**
.20**

.52**
.22**

.65**
.29**

.66**
.28**

1
.29**

1

.38**

.31**

.43**

.09**

.28**

.29**

.33**

.33**

.39**

.28**

As shown in Table 4, all the independent variables analyzed are significantly correlated
to both dependent variables. The overall significant correlations between the independent and
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11

1

dependent variables are to be expected because of the large sample size of each variable.

There

needs to be further analysis to determine whether the hypotheses are supported. The research
intended to analyze the relationship of how both security and governance affect the dependent
variables; therefore, we conduct multiple regression analysis to determine if the hypothesis are
genuinely supported. The bivariate correlation table does allow us to identify some interesting
relationships among the various independent variables.
It is interesting to note the perception of overall security has statistically significant,
though moderate, correlations with security confidence (r=.38, p<0.01), security ability (r=0.41,
p<0.01), confidence in government officials (r=0.42, p<0.01), government responsiveness
(r=0.40, p<0.01), government ability (r=0.42, p<0.01), and availability of government services
(r=0.43, p<0.01). It has only a weak correlation to fair treatment (r=0.28, p<0.01) and a very
weak correlation to security presence (r=0.01, p<0.01).
I was most surprised to find that, though statistically significant, there are very weak
correlations between security presence and the other variables analyzed. Security presence was
almost unrelated to perceptions of overall security (r = 0.01, p<0.01), security confidence (r =
0.02, p<0.01), security ability (r=0.12, p<0.01), confidence in government officials (r = 0.09),
government responsiveness (r=0.12, p<0.01), fair treatment (r = 0.09, p<0.01), and availability of
government services (r = 0.09, p<0.01). Based on the data, the population accounted for some
presence of security forces year over year. Still, their presence does not seem to be significantly
correlated to perceptions of security or governance.
As with overall security, security confidence has stronger correlations with the other
independent variables except for security presence. Security confidence has strong correlation
with security ability (r=0.62, p<0.01), and moderate correlations with confidence in government

41

officials (r=0.50, p<0.01), government responsiveness (r=0.47, p<0.01), and government ability
(r=0.45, p<0.01). It has only a weak correlation to fair treatment (r=0.20, p<0.01) and the
availability of government services (r=0.28, p<0.01).
Like with the other security variables (except for security presence), there are statistically
significant correlations with the governance variables. Security ability has moderate correlations
with confidence in government officials (r=0.52, p<0.01), government responsiveness (r=0.49,
p<0.01), and government ability (r=0.52, p<0.01). It has weak correlations with fair treatment
(r=0.22, p<0.01) and the availability of government services (r=0.29, p<0.01).
There are statistically significant but moderate correlations between confidence in
government officials with overall security (r=0.42, p<0.01), security confidence (r=0.50,
p<0.01), and security ability (r=0.52, p<0.01) and very weak correlation with security presence
(r=0.09, p<0.01). Confidence in government officials has strong correlations with government
responsiveness (r=0.73, p<0.01) and government ability (r=0.65, p<0.01). It has only a weak
correlation to fair treatment (r=0.29, p<0.01) and availability of government services (r=0.33,
p<0.01).
Government responsiveness has statistically significant but moderate correlations with
the overall security (r=0.40, p<0.01), security confidence (r=0.47, p<0.01), and security ability
(r=0.49, p<0.01) and very weak correlation with security presence (r=0.09, p<0.01). It also has
strong correlations with confidence in government (r=0.73, p<0.01) and government ability
(r=0.66, 0.01). It has only a weak correlation to fair treatment (r=0.28, p<0.01) and availability
of government services (r=0.33, p<0.01).
I found statistically significant but moderate correlations between government ability and
overall security (r=0.42, p<0.01), security confidence (r=0.45, p<0.01), and security ability
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(r=0.52, p<0.01) and very weak correlation with security presence (r=0.15, p<0.01).
Government ability has strong correlations with confidence in government (r=0.65, p<0.01) and
government responsiveness (r=0.66, 0.01). It has only a weak correlation to fair treatment
(r=0.29, p<0.01) and has borderline to moderate correlation with availability of government
services (r=0.39, p<0.01).
Fair treatment showed weak correlations with overall security (r=0.28, p<0.01), security
confidence (r=0.20, p<0.01), and security ability (r=0.22, p<0.01) and extremely weak
correlation with security presence (r=0.09, p<0.01). Fair treatment has weak correlations with
other governance variables, confidence in government (r=0.29, p<0.01) and government
responsiveness (r=0.28, 0.01), government ability (r=0.29, p<0.01), and availability of
government services (r=0.28, p<0.01).
There are statistically significant but moderate correlations with overall security (r=0.43,
p<0.01) and government ability (r=0.39, p<0.01). There are weak correlations with security
confidence (r=0.28, p<0.01), and security ability (r=0.29, p<0.01) and extremely weak
correlation with security presence (r=0.09, p<0.01). Availability of government services also has
weak correlations with confidence in government officials (r=0.33, p<0.01), government
responsiveness (r=0.33, 0.01), and fair treatment (r=0.28, p<0.01).
Regression Analyses
My main research question is which of the independent variables best predicts
individuals’ perceptions of their ability to get to markets and local paid employment availability.
To examine these questions, I conducted two multiple regression analyses with all the
independent variables predicting each dependent variable separately.
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When examining the best predictors of perceptions of the ability to get to markets, the
nine independent variables accounted for 25.2% of the variance in ratings of ability to get to
markets. The only non-significant predictor was confidence in government officials (p = 0.38).
The independent variables with the largest standardized beta coefficients were overall security (β
= 0.23, p = 0.00) and the availability of government services (β = 0.20, p = 0.00). The full table
with unstandardized and standardized beta coefficients is below (Table 5).
Note, the confidence in government officials standardized beta coefficient (β = -0.004, p
= 0.384) changes signs when compared to the bivariate correlations matrix (p=0.27). While
difficult to determine the exact cause of the change in relationship, it is possible confidence in
government officials is displaying a suppression effect as we add the different independent
variables into the model. On further review of the bivariate correlations, with the positive and
significant correlation of confidence in government officials to the other independent variables, it
is possible it is could be a confounding variable to the overall model. Since the variable was not
significant to predicting the ability to get to markets, the variable can be eliminated from the
model. Though not in the scope of this study, conducting equivalence testing controlling for
confidence in government could help determine the actual effect of the variable within the
model.
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Table 5: Multiple Regression Analysis of the Ability to Get to Markets
Model

t

Sig.

26.381

0.000

0.230

66.118

0.000

0.001

0.039

13.829

0.000

0.019

0.002

0.029

7.853

0.000

Security ability

0.023

0.002

0.039

9.986

0.000

Confidence in
government officials
Government
responsiveness

-0.002

0.002

-0.004

-0.871

0.384

0.011

0.002

0.026

5.850

0.000

Government ability

0.031

0.001

0.094

22.424

0.000

Fair treatment

0.129

0.006

0.062

20.461

0.000

Availability of
0.203
0.003
government services
a. Dependent Variable: Ability to Get to Market

0.201

61.245

0.000

1

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

B

Std. Error

Beta

(Constant)

0.492

0.019

Overall Security

0.128

0.002

Security presence

0.018

Security confidence

When examining the perceptions of paid job availability in their local areas (Table 6), the
multiple regression analysis found that the nine independent variables accounted for only 13.5%
of the local job availability perceptions variance. This was a relatively smaller percentage of
variance accounted for than with the ability to get to markets.
Of the nine independent variables, this time only government responsiveness (p = 0.81)
was not a significant predictor of job availability perceptions. The independent variables with the
largest standardized beta coefficients were again the availability of government services (β =
0.23, p = 0.00) and overall security (β = 0.15, p = 0.00). These results support the importance of
government services’ availability and overall security perception of attitudes related to the
factors composing economic sentiment.
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As with the ability to get to markets, there are independent variables whose coefficients
switched sides between the bivariate correlations and the multiple regression model. As with the
ability to get to market model, the confidence in government officials standardized beta
coefficient (β = -0.032, p = 0.000) changes signs when compared to the bivariate correlations
matrix (p=0.12). In addition, Security Confidence (β = -0.083, p = 0.000) and Security Ability
(β = -0.039, p = 0.000) have now changed signs in the multiple regression model shown below.
As with confidence in government officials in the ability to get to market multiple regression,
there should be further analysis to determine if these are confounding variables are suppressing
effects.

Table 6: Multiple Regression Analysis of the Availability of Jobs
Model

t

Sig.

54.369

0.000

0.153

40.814

0.000

0.002

0.089

29.213

0.000

-0.062

0.003

-0.083

-20.752

0.000

Security ability

-0.026

0.003

-0.039

-9.215

0.000

Confidence in
government officials
Government
responsiveness

-0.015

0.002

-0.032

-6.525

0.000

0.001

0.002

0.001

0.247

0.805

Government ability

0.040

0.002

0.105

23.343

0.000

Fair treatment

0.095

0.008

0.041

12.433

0.000

Availability of
0.260
0.004
government services
a. Dependent Variable: Job Availability Perceptions

0.227

64.289

0.000

1

Unstandardized Coefficients

Standardized
Coefficients

B

Std. Error

Beta

(Constant)

1.240

0.023

Overall Security

0.097

0.002

Security presence

0.048

Security confidence
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Hypotheses Testing
Results of the hypotheses testing is detailed in the following section. A summary of the
hypotheses test results is shown in Table 7 at the conclusion of this section.
H1: Overall Security
Overall Security has a statistically significant positive relationship to both ability to get to
market (r=0.39, p<0.01) and availability of jobs (r=0.23, p<0.01); therefore, both Hypothesis 1A
and Hypothesis 1B are supported.
I expected a strong correlation for Hypothesis 1A since approximately 61% of Afghans
households derive their income from agriculture and their ability to get to market is essential to
trading their goods (Leao, Ahmed, & Kar, 2018). While significant, it appears there is a
moderate correlation (r=0.39) with the ability to get to market. But, as shown in the multiple
regression model, overall security is the strongest predictor of ability to get to markets.
Hypothesis 1B has a weak correlation (r=0.23) between overall security and availability
of jobs. Though unemployment is difficult to measure in Afghanistan (Berman, Callen, et al.,
2011), estimates range between 11% - 25% during the survey data years (Central Intelligence
Agency, 2020; International Labour Organization, 2020). I expected a stronger correlation
between perceptions of security and the availability of jobs. As noted by Kilcullen (2006b),
security is an enabling factor for economic development; but Table 6 shows overall security is
the second best predictor for availability of jobs.
The results of the bivariate correlations are supported by the multiple linear regression
models as shown in Tables 5 & 6. Overall security is a positive predictor of the perceptions of
both ability to get to market (β=0.230) and availability of jobs (β=0.153).
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H2: Security Presence
Security presence has a statistically significant positive relationship to both ability to get
to market (r=0.12, p<0.01) and availability of jobs (r=0.16, p<0.01); therefore, both Hypothesis
2A and Hypothesis 2B are supported.

I expected a moderate to strong correlation for both

Hypothesis 2A and 2B. While significant, it appears there are very weak correlations for both
dependent variables.
H3: Security Confidence
Security confidence has a statistically significant bivariate relationship to both ability to
get to market (r=0.27, p<0.01) and availability of jobs (r=0.06, p<0.01), but is a negative
predictor of availability of jobs (β=-0.083, p=0.000). Hypothesis 3A (β=0.029, p=0.000) passes
the hypothesis test and is supported. Hypothesis 3B fails the hypothesis test and is not
supported.

I expected a strong correlation for Hypothesis 3A, but while significant, it is a weak

correlation (r=0.27) with the ability to get to market. The correlation with Hypothesis 3B is very
weak (r=0.06) and suggests perceptions of the security forces have a negligible effect on
perceptions of job availability.
H4: Security Ability
Security ability has a statistically significant relationship to both ability to get to market
(r=0.27, p<0.01) and availability of jobs (r=0.09, p<0.01); but it is a negative predictor of
availability of jobs in the regression model. While Hypothesis 4A is supported, because of the
change in sign, Hypothesis 4B is not supported. As explained earlier, security ability may be
causing a suppressing effect or be a confounding variable.
I expected a moderate correlation for both Hypothesis 4A and 4B. Hypothesis 4A has a
weak correlation (r=0.27) with the ability to get to market. The correlation with Hypothesis 4B
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is very weak (r=0.09) and suggests perceptions of the security forces do not affect perceptions of
the availability of jobs.
H5: Confidence in Government Officials
Confidence in government officials has a statistically significant positive bivariate
relationship to both ability to get to market (r=0.27, p<0.01) and availability of jobs (r=0.12,
p<0.01); but is a negative predictor for both dependent variables in their corresponding
regression models.

Confidence in government officials fails the hypothesis test since it has a

negative relationship to each dependent variable. Both Hypothesis 5A and 5B are not supported.
I expected a weak correlation for both Hypothesis 5A and 5B. Hypothesis 5A has a weak
correlation (r=0.27) with the ability to get to market. The correlation with Hypothesis 5B is very
weak (r=0.12) and suggests confidence in government officials has no real effect on perceptions
of the availability of jobs.
H6: Government Responsiveness
Government Responsiveness has a statistically significant positive relationship to both
ability to get to market (r=0.28, p<0.01) and availability of jobs (r=0.14, p<0.01); therefore, both
Hypothesis 6A and Hypothesis 6B are supported.

I expected weak correlations between

Hypothesis 6A and 6B and the dependent variables. Like prior hypotheses, Hypothesis 6A has a
weak correlation (r=0.28) with perceptions of the ability to get to market, and Hypothesis 6B has
a very weak (r=0.14) correlation to perceptions of the availability of jobs.
H7: Government Ability
Government ability has a statistically significant positive relationship to both ability to
get to market (r=0.33, p<0.01) and availability of jobs (r=0.20, p<0.01); therefore, both
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Hypothesis 7A and Hypothesis 7B are supported.

I expected weak correlations between

Hypothesis 7A and 7B and the dependent variables. Government ability has weak correlations
with both perceptions of the ability to get to market (r=0.33) and perceptions of the availability
of jobs (r=0.14).
H8: Fair Treatment
Fair treatment has a statistically significant positive relationship to both ability to get to
market (r=0.23, p<0.01) and availability of jobs (r=0.16, p<0.01); therefore both Hypothesis 8A
and Hypothesis 8B are supported.

I expected weak correlations between Hypothesis 8A and 8B

and the dependent variables. Fair treatment has a weak correlation with perceptions of the ability
to get to market (r=0.23) and a very weak correlation with perceptions of the availability of jobs
(r=0.16).
H9: Availability of Government Services
The availability of government services has a statistically significant positive relationship
to both ability to get to market (r=0.38, p<0.01) and availability of jobs (r=0.31, p<0.01);
therefore, Hypothesis 9A and Hypothesis 9B are both supported.

I expected weak correlations

between Hypothesis 9A and 9B and the dependent variables. Surprisingly, next to Overall
Security, Availability of government services has the strongest correlations to the dependent
variables. Borderline moderate, Availability of government services has a weak correlation with
perceptions of the ability to get to market (r=0.38). Also, perceptions of the availability of
government services are the most correlated among the independent variables to perceptions of
the availability of jobs (r=0.31).
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Table 7: Summary of Hypotheses Testing: Ability to get to Markets
Hypothesis
H1a
H2a
H3a
H4a
H5a
H6a
H7a
H8a
H9a

Variable
Overall Security
Security Presence
Security Confidence
Security Ability
Confidence in government officials
Government Responsiveness
Government Ability
Fair Treatment
Availability of Government Services

Result
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

Table 8: Summary of Hypotheses Testing: Availability of Jobs
Hypothesis
H1b
H2b
H3b
H4b
H5b
H6b
H7b
H8b
H9b

Variable
Overall Security
Security Presence
Security Confidence
Security Ability
Confidence in government officials
Government Responsiveness
Government Ability
Fair Treatment
Availability of Government Services

Result
Supported
Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Not Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported
Supported

Step-wise Regression
While nearly all the independent variables were significant predictors of both dependent
variables (i.e., ability to get to markets and perceived job availability), I conducted a step-wise
regression analysis because there was such a large sample size. Step-wise regression was used to
examine which independent variables would best predict the dependent variables by analyzing
the increases in variance as each independent variable was added into the regression model.
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First, I ran the step-wise regression model with the ability to get to markets as the
dependent variable (Table 8). The step-wise regression results show that overall security, the
availability of government services, and perceived government ability account for 24.3 percent
of the variance in ratings of the ability to get to markets. Once these three variables are entered
into the regression model, subsequent predictors account for less than a 1 percent increase in
variance.

Table 9: Step-wise Regression for Ability to Get to Market

Model Summary
Change Statistics
R
.420a

R Square
0.176

Adjusted R
Square
0.176

Std. Error of the
Estimate
0.937

R Square
Change
0.176

Sig. F Change
0.000

2

.476b

0.227

0.227

0.908

0.051

0.000

3

.493c

0.244

0.243

0.898

0.017

0.000

4

.498d

0.248

0.247

0.896

0.004

0.000

5

.500e

0.250

0.250

0.894

0.002

0.000

6

.501f

0.251

0.251

0.893

0.001

0.000

7

.502g

0.252

0.252

0.893

0.001

0.000

8

.502h

0.252

0.252

0.893

0.000

0.000

Model
1

a. Predictors: (Constant), Q2Total
b. Predictors: (Constant), Q2Total, q15
c. Predictors: (Constant), Q2Total, q15, Q11Total
d. Predictors: (Constant), Q2Total, q15, Q11Total, q14g
e. Predictors: (Constant), Q2Total, q15, Q11Total, q14g, Q7Total
f. Predictors: (Constant), Q2Total, q15, Q11Total, q14g, Q7Total, Q6_1Total
g. Predictors: (Constant), Q2Total, q15, Q11Total, q14g, Q7Total, Q6_1Total, Q6_2Total
h. Predictors: (Constant), Q2Total, q15, Q11Total, q14g, Q7Total, Q6_1Total, Q6_2Total, Q10Total

Next, I ran the step-wise regression model with perceptions of job availability as the
dependent variable (Table 9). The step-wise regression results show that overall security, the
availability of government services, and the presence of security forces account for 12.2 percent
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of the variance in ratings of local job availability. Once these three variables are entered into the
regression model, subsequent predictors account for less than a 1 percent increase in variance.
These results provide supporting evidence that if you would like to change perceptions of
economic sentiment in areas that are enduring counterinsurgency conflicts, it might be best to
focus most on perceptions of overall security, security presence, and the availability of
government services, and changing perceptions of the government’s ability.

Table 10: Step-wise Regression for Availability of Jobs

Model Summary
Change Statistics
R
.311a

R Square
0.097

Adjusted R
Square
0.097

Std. Error of the
Estimate
1.114

R Square
Change
0.097

Sig. F Change
0.000

2

.336b

0.113

0.113

1.104

0.016

0.000

3

.350c

0.123

0.122

1.098

0.010

0.000

4

.357d

0.128

0.128

1.094

0.005

0.000

5

.364e

0.133

0.133

1.091

0.005

0.000

6

.366f

0.134

0.134

1.090

0.001

0.000

7

.367g

0.135

0.135

1.090

0.001

0.000

8

.368h

0.135

0.135

1.090

0.000

0.000

Model
1

a. Predictors: (Constant), q15
b. Predictors: (Constant), q15, Q2Total
c. Predictors: (Constant), q15, Q2Total, Q6_1Total
d. Predictors: (Constant), q15, Q2Total, Q6_1Total, Q6_2Total
e. Predictors: (Constant), q15, Q2Total, Q6_1Total, Q6_2Total, Q11Total
f. Predictors: (Constant), q15, Q2Total, Q6_1Total, Q6_2Total, Q11Total, q14g
g. Predictors: (Constant), q15, Q2Total, Q6_1Total, Q6_2Total, Q11Total, q14g, Q7Total
h. Predictors: (Constant), q15, Q2Total, Q6_1Total, Q6_2Total, Q11Total, q14g, Q7Total, Q9Total
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CHAPTER FIVE:
DISCUSSION

Summary of Results
The research provided exciting insights into how perceptions of security and governance
affect economic outlook. First, we find that overall security and government services availability
were the most significant predictors of the ability to get to market and job availability. Second,
confidence in government officials and government responsiveness were not significant
predictors for attitudes towards the ability to get to market and availability of jobs, respectively.
Finally, while security forces' presence was very weakly correlated to security and governance
perceptions, it remains a significant albeit small predictor of the ability to get to market but
contributes more to predicting availability of jobs.
The research supported hypotheses H1 through H3, and H6 through H9, for both
dependent variables. Security Confidence (H3b) and Security Ability (H4b) were not supported
as having a significant positive relationship with Availability of Jobs. In fact, both had negative
effects on the dependent variable. This runs contrary to accepted general theory within
counterinsurgency, where substantial effort is made to develop and promote the legitimacy and
ability of the security forces among the population. According to theory, these should have
positive effects. Though not within the scope of this study to determine if these are confounding
variables or if they are displaying suppression effects, it should be looked into further to identify
why there is a negative impact to perceptions in availability of jobs in these circumstances.
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Confidence in government officials (H5) was not supported with either dependent
variable. Though not included in this research, corruption in the Afghan government is a known
factor in determining support from the Afghan populace (Iyengar, Shapiro, & Hegarty, 2017).
The problem of corruption was the basis for expecting weak correlations of the governance
variables to the economic outlook. The data showed the population’s confidence in government
officials as somewhere between “some” and “no” confidence. The regression findings show
confidence in government officials, in this case, has a non-significant effect in predicting ability
to get to markets (β=-0.004, p=0.384), and a small negative effect in availability of jobs (β=0.032).
Yet, the research identified both the correlation, and strong predictive relationship, of
government services availability to both ability to get to market and availability of jobs. As the
population perceived better benefits from the government, you could expect an improved
perception of their economic opportunities. This is important because we see how, even in the
face of a lack of confidence in their officials, the population can still perceive positive benefit to
economic activity if the right services are available.
The weak correlation between security presence and both the availability to get to market
and availability of jobs is interesting. As noted in counterinsurgency doctrine, security presence
is believed to be critical to securing the populace and separating them from the insurgents (U.S.
Army & U.S. Marine Corps, 2014). The interactions between the security forces and the
population reinforce the perception safety and enable a better understanding between the
counterinsurgent and the population (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018).

But, the literature also shows

security forces could serve to reduce violence or invite violence as their presence can invite
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insurgent attacks (Iyengar et al., 2017). Though not included in this study, this is the point to
compare data on actual events of violence and determine the confounding effects.
While it was expected to see a statistically significant correlation between overall security
and economic outlook, it was surprising to find such a weak correlation between the perceptions
of security presence and other factors analyzed. This finding runs contrary to what one would
expect based on our theories and the Kilcullen Three Pillars framework. A core tenet of
counterinsurgency is for the counterinsurgent forces to be among the populace to separate the
insurgent threat from the population and increase confidence in the H.N. government (Bjelajac,
1966; Galula, 2006; Petraeus, 2006).
The regression analysis shows that security presence is a predictor for the availability of
jobs, though it has minimal impact in predicting the ability to get to markets. Our findings
suggest a need to look further into this phenomenon. Considering both the weak correlations,
and the negative predictive contribution of other security questions related to the security forces,
how does security presence make up for a lack of security confidence and ability to provide
safety? While not within the scope of this study, other factors such as cultural differences,
perceptions of corruption, and grievances over the effects of violence from counterinsurgent
operations, could help explain the findings.
Implications for Practice
This research began as a quest to fill a personal and professional gap in knowledge about
how perceptions affect economic outlook in stability operations. Based on the findings of this
study, I believe there are some important implications for practice. Overall the model and results
contribute to knowledge and the community of practice by providing insights into factors that
should be considered in planning and assessing economic development efforts in stability
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operations. The research provides a better understanding of how security and governance
perceptions affect the popular perception of economic outlook.
The results of this study reinforce much of the literature and address how security and
governance do impact the population’s perception of ability to conduct economic activity. As
was expected overall security was most important predictor for both availability of jobs and
ability to get to markets among the security questions. What is noteworthy is the small impact of
confidence in the security forces, their abilities, and both confidence and abilities of government
officials. According to the results the confidence of security forces or their abilities in confidence
government officials and fair treatment account for approximately only 0.8% of the variance and
perceptions of ability to get to market and availability of jobs.
During my time in Afghanistan the majority of our efforts focused on promoting
confidence in the security forces and the government as a whole in order to increase their
legitimacy and generate popular support and participation in economic activity and rebuilding
the country. To increase economic activity, these results suggest a more nuanced approach could
have been more effective.
In Afghanistan, where more than half the population participates in the agricultural
sector, ability to get to market is critical. Applying the findings of the study the focus should
have been on informing the population on successes and overall security improvements,
availability of government services; reinforced with the appropriate level of security presence.
Doing so could have improved the perception of ability to get to markets and availability of jobs
better than a focus on promoting government officials and security forces.
I do not pretend to insinuate that findings for Afghanistan would be generalizable into
other conflicts, rather, it is important to analyze the relationships between perceptions of security
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and governance to relevant local economic outlook. In doing this, significant relationships are
identified which can inform planning and execution of stability operations in order to promote
economic outlook and activity.
The opportunity to apply this approach should not be confined strictly to overseas
conflicts or the military, but rather many of the same concerns and grievances are prevalent
among domestic populations as they look to their economic outlook. Currently in the U.S., with
various social concerns and the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, this approach could be useful
in determining relationships between concerns of community policing, local government
effectiveness, and health concerns, on local consumer confidence (as proxy to economic outlook)
in order to understand how to best re-open our societies.
A better understanding of how complementary efforts in security and governance affect
economic outlook can help donor nations and planners develop more effective programs that can
reduce conflict and prevent violence. While the literature has not proven a direct link between
economic development and violence reduction, this study reveals the importance of
understanding the effects between these on the population's perception.
Considering the massive investments by donor countries into stability efforts, this
research can inform decisions regarding investments in security, governance, and economic aid
to maximize the effect on recipient populations' economic outlook. For instance, facilitating
government services availability has a more significant impact on economic outlook and can
justify developing government services over other governance programs.
Finally, understanding perceptions provide better insight into local contexts and informs
development efforts to ensure programs meet the population’s needs and help legitimize host
nation efforts.
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Limitations to the Research
No work is perfect and I understand there are limitations to the study which I have
conducted. As mentioned before, the results of this study in and of itself may not be
generalizable to other conflict areas such as the Philippines, other areas in the Middle East, and
Africa. What is important is the process developed and analyzing the relationships between
governance and security in these areas to gain a better understanding of the population’s
perceptions and outlooks.
Given the large volume of data available in this data set, decisions were made to limit the
scope of the study to the relevant questions directly related to security, security forces,
confidence in government and their services, and the two measures of economic outlook. I
acknowledge the dataset is much richer and there is opportunity to further enhance the findings
by adding other modules such as crime, community cohesion, etc. Also, there is opportunity to
delve deeper into the data; for example, it would be interesting to determine whether one type of
security force (Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police or Local Police) better explain
and predict our dependent variables.
These limitations should not detract from the significance of this research but need to be
acknowledged in order to assist other researchers in finding opportunities to improve analysis on
this problem set. Conflicts, and stability operations in particular, are complex problem sets that
should be looked at in multiple and varied ways. As we introduce other variables, such as the
perception of corruption, we should gain new insights and further refine our understanding of the
relationships between these complex variables.
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Opportunities for Further Research
Economic development and aid within stability operations will continue to be
increasingly crucial as nations try to manage conflict in underdeveloped areas. Influencing
populations to support government efforts in creating stability requires further research into how
perceptions can be transformed into actions that promote violence and conflict resolution. More
research is needed to understand why populations will not act on their perceptions. Among the
questions to answer include the following: (1) How does improved economic sentiment increase
participation in economic activity? (2) Are specific security efforts (i.e., reduction in crime,
counterterrorism, etc.) more impactful in creating better economic outlook perceptions and
participation in economic activity? (3) Does an improved economic outlook improve the
investment climate during stabilization operations?

Conclusion
This study points to the importance of understanding perceptions and how they relate
among the different efforts within stabilization operations to influence populations affected by
conflict. The models created in this research reveal how security and governance affect economic
perception within the context of stability operations conducted in Afghanistan. I believe it can be
applied to understanding not only zones of conflict, but also in situations of domestic unrest.
The potential impact is the improvement of economic opportunities and outlook, which can
reduce violent conflicts and improve millions living in conflict zones.
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